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trial is to elicit the truth, and the use of cross-examination has tradi-
tionally been considered an effective method of achieving this. The
Ohio prior testimony rule which compels exclusion in many cases,
even where the right of cross-examination is adequately protected, is
contrary to the purpose of the trial. The court should have more
discretion as to the admission of prior testimony. From the discus-
sion of the Bartlett, Dougherty, and Lyon cases it is apparent that
the courts exercise their discretion most diligently to serve the inter-
ests of justice and to protect the rights of the litigants. While the
Model Code presents a more radical view than any cases, the Uni-
form Rules reflect the attitude represented by the three cases afore-
mentioned. All are far more liberal than Ohio's attitude.
To bind the judges by statute is not to give due credit to their
ability to conduct a trial and exercise their discretion. A change in
the Ohio statute, the elimination of the restriction, would let the
triers of fact have the benefit of important testimony. In the Lyon
case the testimony of the motorman was clearly relevant to the negli-
gence issue, and to try the case without his testimony would have
made it very nearly impossible to ascertain the facts. It is safe to
say that if a case similar to the Lyon case were tried in Ohio, the type
of prior testimony proffered in the Lyon case would not be admis-
sible unless the Ohio Code were amended 44 to conform to the present
trend toward admissibility.
JOHN H. WILHARM, JR.
Obscenity Through the Mails
This note will concern itself with the authority of the United
States Post Office Department, emanating from the Constitution,
legislation, and postal regulations, to investigate and terminate the
sending of obscene material through the mails. The Post Office De-
partment estimates that 500 million dollars worth of such material
will be sent by means of the mails this year alone.' This is half as
much money as all the legitimate book publishers in America take in.2
The sales volume of this matter has doubled in the last five years and
could, despite the increase in arrests, double again over the next four
years unless vigorously checked.3 To add insult to the injury, the
purveyors of this material are including the United States Post Of-
fice as a party to their crime.
Although this problem has been with us for years, only recently
44. It is suggested that it would be sufficient to add "or in any subsequent proceedings
wherein the parties and issues are substantially the same" immediately following "further
trial of the case." The dead-man statute, Ohio Revised Code § 2317.03 (G), would also
need to be amended in a similar manner. At present it permits testimony viva voce only
after the admission of prior testimony in a "further trial of the case."
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has the law been catching up, and it still has a long road to travel.
Just what is the present status of the law regarding the Post Office
and obscenity?
STATUTES GRANTING AUTHORITY TO THE POST OFFICE
DEPARTMENT
At present there are four important statutes which serve to com-
bat obscenity. Two of these deal with interstate commerce4 and two
with the mails.5 The former two statutes are not within the scope
of this note.
Title 18 of the United States Code, section 1461, declares ob-
scene matter to be nonmailable and makes the sending of such ma-
terial through the mails a crime.6 Although this statute is basically
criminal, the Post Office utilizes it to stop, and hold, detected ob-
scene material en route to the consumer; thus, the statute also serves
as a civil sanction against the violator.
Title 39 of the United States Code, section 259 (a), the other
statute involved, permits the Department to detain, stamp "unlaw-
ful," and return mail which is sent to anyone peddling obscenity; it
also grants the Post Office the authority to refuse to cash postal
money orders or postal notes drawn to such a person. It should be
emphasized that the mail is not impounded under this section, but is
returned to the sender thereof. Thus, section 1461 is directed at the
outgoing mail which contains the lascivious material, whereas section
1. Release No. 260, Post Office Department 1, 2 (Address by Postmaster General Arthur E.
Summerfield before the Women's City Club of Cleveland) October 8, 1959; Warburton, You
and the Law vs. Smut, This Week (Cleveland), September 27, 1959, p. 15, col. 1.
2. Warburton, You and the aw vs. Smut, This Week (Cleveland), September 27, 1959, p.
15, col. 2.
3. Release No. 260, Post Office Department 1, 6 (Address by Postmaster General Arthur E.
Summerfield before the Womens City Club of Cleveland) October 8, 1959.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465 (1958).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958); 64 Star. 451 (1950), 39 U.S.C. § 259(a) (1958).
6. The relevant portions of § 1461 provide:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing,
device, or substance ....
is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or
delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
The statutory penalties for violation are up to five years imprisonment and/or a maximum
fine of $5,000 for the first offense, and up to ten years imprisonment and a maximum $10,000
fine for subsequent offenses.
7. The relevant portions of § 259(a) provide:
Upon evidence satisfactory to the Postmaster General that any person... is ob-
taining, or attempting to obtain, remittances... through the mails for any obscene,
lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or vile article... the Postmaster General may-
(a) instruct postmasters... to return all such mail matter [sent to the purveyor
of obscenity] . .. -with the word "Unlawful!" plainly written or stamped . . . and
(b) forbid the payment.., of any money order or postal note drawn to the
order of such [a purveyor).
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259(a) applies to the mail and postal remittances that are sent to
the purveyor.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THIS DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
The Criminal Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461
The federal constitution grants Congress the power to establish
post offices and post roads." Under this authority the legislature en-
acted sections 1461 and 259 (a).
Recently the Supreme Court, in Roth v. United States,9 sustained
the constitutionality of section 1461.10 In upholding a criminal con-
viction, the Court announced that the statute was a proper exercise
of the postal power delegated to Congress by the Constitution, par-
ticularly since obscenity was outside the area of protected speech and
press.
The Court rejected the early leading definition of obscenity,"
which was that the material was to be judged merely by the effect of
an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons.'" The
standard by which obscenity now is to be judged is as follows:
. . . [W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.,3
The salacious articles need not perceptibly create a clear and
present danger of antisocial conduct, but merely a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts.' 4 If the article includes material with the slightest
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power ... To establish Post Offices
and post Roads."
9. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
10. Roth was also convicted by a California court for keeping obscene books for sale in viola-
lation of a state statute. The two cases were combined before the Supreme Court and both
convictions were upheld.
11. Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868):
... [T]he test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.
12. Some early American courts adopted this standard: Knowles v. United States, 170 Fed.
409 (8th Cir. 1909); MacFadden v. United States, 165 Fed. 51, 52 (3d Cir. 1908); United
States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, 1102 (No. 14571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); United States
v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); United States v. Clark, 38 Fed. 500, 502
(E.D. Mo. 1889).
13. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). Many American decisions, prior to the Roth case, adopted
this standard: Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d 842, 844 (6th Cir. 1957); One v. Olesen,
241 F.2d 772, 778 (9th Cit. 1957); Hallmark Productions, Inc. v. Mosley, 190 F.2d 904,
910 (8th Cir. 1951); Verner v. United States, 183 F.2d 184, 185 (9th Cir. 1950); Burstein
v. United States, 178 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1949); Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512
(D.C. Cir. 1945); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1940); United
States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936); Klaw v. Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534, 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Bonica v. Olesen, 126 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1954); New Ameri-
can Library of World Literature, Inc. v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823, 830 (N.D. Ohio 1953);
United States v. Musgrave, 160 Fed. 700 (E.D. Ark. 1908).
14. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957).
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redeeming social value, it is entitled to full protection, even if the
ideas expressed are contrary to public opinion. 5
The Civil Statute, 39 U.S.C. § 2 59(a)
Although the Supreme Court has never actually ruled on the con-
stitutionality of section 259 (a), there is little doubt as to its validity
because its wording is similar to section 1461.1" In view of this like-
ness, and the fact that the scope and purpose of the two statutes are
similar, there exists strong justification for the two laws being in-
terpreted in pari materia. Moreover, lower courts have declared
section 259 (a) to be constitutional.1 7
Another appropriate analogy can be drawn from the Supreme
Court's decisions relating to title 39 of the United States Code, sec-
tion 259, which is a counterpart of section 259(a). Section 259 al-
lows the Post Office to return mail that is being sent to anyone uti-
lizing the mails for fraudulent purposes. In Public Clearing House
v. Coyne,'- the Supreme Court first upheld the present section 259.
The Postmaster General had issued a fraud order against the appel-
lant, directing that its incoming mail be seized and returned to the
senders thereof, stamping it "fraudulent." The Court held this ac-
tion to be constitutional in that Congress could designate what may be
carried in, and what excluded from, the mails.
Years later, section 259 was once more before the Supreme
Court.19 Again, the Court refused to outlaw its operation, but in-
stead, followed their earlier decision in the Coyne case.
Although fraud differs from obscenity, the sanctions under sec-
tion 259 and 259 (a) are similar.20 Therefore, since the penalty of
returning the respondent's incoming mail was upheld in the fraud
cases, this precedent constitutes cogent evidence which further but-
tresses the validity of section 259 (a).
ARE THE STATUTES CONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED
Title S of the United States Code, sections 22 and 369, grants to
the Postmaster General the power to prescribe regulations for the
15. Id. at 484.
16. Section 1461 provides:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing,
device, or substance ....
Section 259 (a) provides:
... for any obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or vile article, matter, thing,
device, for substance ....
Also see Bonica v. Olesen, 126 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
17. Glanzman v. Schaffer, 252 F.2d 333, 334 (2d Cir. 1958); Glanzman v. Fincle, 150 F.
Supp. 823, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
18. 194 U.S. 497 (1904).
19. Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948).
20. Under each statute the Postmaster General may order a return of mail sent to a person
conducting a fraudulent scheme or to one mailing obscene matter.
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governing of his department.2 1 Under this authority, postal regula-
tions have been issued which afford the respondent a hearing, either
under section 259 (a) 22 or 1461,23 to determine whether the material
is obscene.
Hearings
The procedures used are closely modeled after the Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,24 and the postal regulations declare that
hearing examiners shall be appointed and qualified pursuant to the
act.25 However, the procedures provided under the postal regula-
tions are not all similar to those provided in the FAPA, nor are they
as detailed. Should a discrepancy arise between the regulations and
the FAPA, a court will be forced to decide whether the action of the
Department is subject to the provisions of the act.
Some earlier decisions held that the FAPA was not applicable to
departmental action ;26 however, the modern trend is to require that
the procedures under the act be followed when a party would other-
wise be denied some privilege under it, and hence, be denied due
process of law.
The FAPA provides:
No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the
provisions of this chapter except to the extent that such legislation shall
do so expressly.28
Congress has not expressly excepted either section 259(a) or
1461.29 Therefore, unless the Post Office can "pigeon-hole" either
21. 72 Stat. 547, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), authorizes the head of each department to issue
regulations; this grant was held to be within the scope of legislative power. Ex parte Curtis,
106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882). 42 Stat. 24 (1921), 5 U.S.C. § 369 (1958), specifically author-
izes the Postmaster General to issue regulations.
22. Postal Reg., 39 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-.34 (Supp. 1959), provide hearing procedures under
39 U.S.C. § 259 (a).
23. 24 Fed. Reg. 4026 (1959), amending 39 C.F.R. §§ 203.1-.14, provides hearing pro-
cedures under 18 U.S.C. § 1461.
24. 62 Star. 99 (1948), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
25. 39 C.F.R. § 201.18 (Supp. 1959); 24 Fed. Reg. 4027 (1959), amending 39 C.F.R.
203.8 (Supp. 1959).
26. Cates v. Haderlein, 189 F.2d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 804 (1951)
(mem.); Bersoff v. Donaldson, 174 F.2d 494, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
27. Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951) (maem.); Olesen v. Stanard, 227 F.2d 785, 788
(9th Cir. 1955); Stanard v. Olesen, 74 Sup. Ct. 768, 771 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1954);
Door v. Donaldson, 195 F.2d 764, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry,
175 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Borg-Johnson Electronics, Inc. v. Christenberry,
169 F. Supp. 746, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Pinkus v. Reilly, 157 F. Supp. 548, 549 (D.N.J.
1957); Klaw v. Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Bonica v. Olesen, 126 F.
Supp. 398, 400 (S.D. Cal. 1954); LeBaron v. Olesen, 125 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Cal. 1954);
Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
28. 60 Star. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958).
29. Borg-Johnson Electronics, Inc. v. Christenberry, 169 F. Supp. 746, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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statute into one of the general exceptions in the FAPA, it will be com-
pelled to follow the mandates of the act.
Section 5 of the FAPA states that its regulations are to be fol-
lowed in every "adjudication required by statute." 30 The Post Office
Department and some courts have contended that this qualification
exempts the Department since neither section 259(a) nor 1461 re-
quire a hearing.31 Recent cases have hurdled this obstacle by reading
into section 259(a) a requirement for a hearing. 2 A number of
courts have employed other grounds for imposing the act,3" while
some merely assume it applies. 4
Regardless of whether the FAPA applies to departmental hear-
ings, the courts have, in the past, allowed judicial review on the ques-
tion of whether the agency had abused its discretion in labeling some-
thing obscene. In applying sections 259(a) and 1461, both the
courts3 5 and the Post Office Department" now employ the test of
obscenity as expounded in the Roth case.
Moreover, the respondent cannot complain that his right to a
public trial under the sixth amendment has been infringed because an
administrative officer, and not a jury, has determined the material
to be lascivious.3 7  Impounding the defendant's mail is a civil sanction
and not a criminal prosecution, so "due process of law" in this in-
stance need not be by judicial process.
30. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958).
31. Cates v. Haderlein, 189 F.2d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 804 (1951)
(mem.); Bersoff v. Donaldson, 174 F.2d 494, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
32. Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951) (mem.); Also see Riss & Co., Inc. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951) (mem.); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 239 U.S. 33, 50 (1950).
33. Stanard v. Olesen, 74 Sup. Ct. 768, 771 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1954); Door v. Don-
aldson, 195 F.2d 764, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Borg-Johnson Electronics, Inc. v. Christenberry,
169 F. Supp. 746, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Pinkus v. Reilly, 157 F. Supp. 548, 549 (D.N.J.
1957).
34. Olesen v. Stanard, 227 F2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1955); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christen-
berry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Klaw v. Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534, 539(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Bonica v. Olesen, 126 F. Supp. 398, 400 (S.D. Cal. 1954); LeBaron v.
Olesen, 125 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Cal.
1954).
35. United States v. Padell, 262 F.2d 357 (2d Cit. 1958) (nem.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
942 (1959); United States v. Keller, 259 F.2d 54, 57 (3d Cit. 1958); Glanzman v. Schaffer,
252 F.2d 333, 334 (2d Cit. 1958); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114, 118
(D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 372 (1958) (nzem.); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry,
175 F. Supp. 488, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Glanzman v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 485, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
36. Jefferson Creations, Inc., PosT OFFICE DEFT. HEARING No. 1/87 (1959); Milco Spe-
cialties, PosT OFFICE DEPT. HEARING No. 1/96 (1959); The Filmsters, POST OFFICE DEPT.
HEAING No. 1/30 (1958); Schillad, PosT OFFICE DEPT. HEARNG No. 5/180 (1958);
T-R Productions, PoST OFFICE DEPT. HEARING No. 5/230 (1958).
37. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 444 (1957); Donaldson v. Read Maga-
zine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 189 (1948); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 509
(1904); Glanzman v. Schaffer, 252 F.2d 333 (2d Cit. 1958); Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d
788, 789 (2d Cir. 1949).
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Interim Order
Title 39 of the United States Code, section 259(b), enacted in
1956,38 permits the Post Office to impound the respondent's incom-
ing mail for a period of twenty days pending a hearing in proceed-
ings pursuant to section 259(a). The Post Office also has the au-
thority under section 259 (b) to extend the twenty day period by fil-
ing a petition in district court. Since the Department may exercise
such extraordinary power,3 9 the courts have construed each step for
an extension of time required by the statute as being jurisdictional,
and a failure to comply strictly with all of them will invalidate the
postal order. 40
Unlike section 259(a), section 1461 not only lacks a provision
for such a temporary seizure of the mail, but it does not even contain
language specifically authorizing the Post Office to stop mail once it
has been determined to be obscene. Furthermore, whereas section
259 (a) is civil, section 1461 is a criminal statute.4'
Lower courts have relied on the following phrase in section 1461
to extend the purview of the statute:
[Every obscene article] is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall
not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any
letter carrier.
This language has been interpreted to mean that section 1461 is not
only penal, but imposes a duty on the postmaster to seize and detain
this prohibited material after a fair and impartial hearing.42 Al-
though the Supreme Court has not as yet ruled on this point, the pres-
ent trend in the law would seem to indicate that its decision would be
in accord with those of the lower courts. This solution, however,
does not answer the question of whether the Post Office can order
an interim stoppage of mail pending the final outcome of a hearing
under section 1461. The problem can be analogized to the status of
the law relating to section 259 (a) before 259 (b) was enacted. At
that time the courts were split, some implying that the power to order
an interim stoppage existed because it was necessary to effectuate
38. This statute was enacted six years after section 259(a). Subsection (c) of this law ex-
pressly excuses 259(b) from the requirements of the FAPA.
39. A district court has declared that section 259(b) does not violate due process of law.
Schillaci v. Olesen, 161 F. Supp. 227, 230 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
40. Toberoff v. Summerfield, 256 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1958); Togeroff v. Surnmerfield, 245
F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1957).
41. Tide 18 is designated Crime and Criminal Procedure.
42. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355
U.S. 372 (1958) (mem.), (citing the Roth case); One v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 779 (9th
Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (mem.), (citing the Roth case); Glanzman v. Chris-
tenberry, 175 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Monart, Inc. v. Christenberry, 168 F. Supp.
654, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Postal regulations issued pursuant to section 1461 declare ob-
scenity to be nonmailable and directs that it not be conveyed. 39 C.F.R. §§ 14.1, 14.3 (1955).
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properly section 259 (a) ;43 others stated that such a decision would
be tantamount to legislation." The issue is probably not too impor-
tant in the majority of cases because of the short interval between
the impounding and the hearing dates.45
Scope of the Final Order
Once the material is declared obscene, the Post Office Depart-
ment's order must be directed toward only the salacious matter. It
may not include all the respondent's mail, or the decree will be struck
down as being a prior restraint.4
If separating the legal material from the illegal is practicably im-
possible, this rule should be relaxed. The Supreme Court has de-
dared that an order can be directed against all of the respondent's
mail if, prima facie, it can reasonably be said that all the mail is con-
nected with the illegal enterprise.47
Additional Action
The Post Office also has the authority under sections 259 (a)
and 1461 to declare nonmailable, material which advertises obscen-
ity.48 It is immaterial whether the article in which the solicitation is
present is obscene, or, whether the book or pictures advertised there-
in are.49  The only relevant issue is, does the advertisement have the
"leer that promises obscenity" ?50
A possible deterrent which would greatly restrict the outlet of
salacious material would be a suspension or revocation of the sender's
second class mailing permit.51 This action was held constitutional by
43. Barel v. Fiske, 136 F. Supp. 751, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Williams v. Petty, 136 F. Supp.
283, 285 (E.D. Okla. 1953); In re Rice, 256 Fed. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). But see Grove
Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
44. Stanard v. Olesen, 74 Sup. Ct. 768, 771 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1954); Donnell
Mfg. Co. v. Wyman, 156 Fed. 415, 417 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1907).
45. 24 Fed. Reg. 4027 (1959), amending 39 C.F.R. § 203A (Supp. 1959), declares that
the hearing shall be held within 10 days from the date of the filing of the complaint.
46. Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 33 U.S. 178, 184 (1948) (dictum); Tourlanes
Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 231 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (-mem); Oakley v. Summer-
field, 231 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (mem.); Summerfield v. Sunshine Book Co., 221 F.2d
42, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955); Pinkus v. Reilly, 170 F.2d
786, 788 (3rd Cir. 1948); Glanaman v. Finkle, 150 F. Supp, 823, 825 (E.D.N.Y. *1957).
47. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 510 (1904); Cadillac Publishing Co. v.
Summerfield, 155 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D.D.C. 1957); Klaw v. Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534, 536
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
48. Both statutes forbid drculating information of any kind as to where, how, or from whom
obscenity may be obtained.
49. Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 608 (1895); United States v. Hornich, 229 F.2d
120, 122 (3d Cir. 1956); Cadillac Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 155 F. Supp. 313, 314
(D.D.C. 1957); Kaw v. Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
50. Klaw v. Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
51. See 72 Star. 139, 39 U.S.C. § 226 (1958); Postal Reg., 39 C.F.R. § 22.3 (Supp. 1959)
(application for second class privileges).
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the Supreme Court in a case involving the mailing of articles in vio-
lation of the Espionage Act. 2
This penalty53 was imposed against a sender of risque and racy
material in Hannegan v. Esquire, Incorporated,4 but failed, not be-
cause it could not constitutionally be accomplished, but because of the
manner in which it was attempted. The Postmaster, while conceding
that the material was not obscene, contended that it was morally im-
proper, and that the sender had a positive duty to mail only articles
for the public good. 5 The Supreme Court rejected this argument
and declared that since the magazines were mailable there existed no
grounds for the revocation of the respondent's second class mailing
permit. This precedent should not be interpreted as standing for the
proposition that a solicitor of erotic matter cannot have his permit
revoked, for the material in the Hannegan case was not technically
obscene and, therefore, was mailable.5 After its failure in that case,
the Post Office abandoned this method of attack.
METHODS OF DETECTION
Although many restrictions impede the discovery of obscenity,
there are several avenues that the Post Office may traverse in de-
tecting this objectionable material.
Evidence of obscenity usually emanates from two sources. Either
letters of complaint are written by the public, 57 or the Post Office
itself uncovers the illegal enterprise.58  The defendant cannot object
if a government inspector writes decoy letters in answer to which the
respondent mails the prohibited matter. The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held this action not to constitute entrapment.5 9
52. United States v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
53. 31 Stat. 1107 (1901), 39 U.S.C. § 232 (1958), declares that a second class mail privilege
shall not be suspended without a hearing. Postal Reg., 39 C.F.R. § 22.8 (Supp. 1959), also
order a hearing, and 39 C.F.R. § 201.40 (Supp. 1959) provides the procedures for such a
hearing.
54. 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
55. The Government cited 72 Stat. 139, 39 U.S.C. § 226 (1958) for authority. This
statute provides that:
... [T]he conditions upon which a publication shall be admitted to the second
class are as follows.
* * Fourth. It must be originated and published for the dissemination of infor-
mation of a public character ....
56. Postal Reg. 39 C.F.R. § 22.2 (1955), declare that obscene matter is nonmailable and
shall not be conveyed at the second class rate. However, this contention was not argued in
the Hannagan case.
57. Warburton, You and the Law vs. Smut, This Week (Cleveland), September 27, 1959,
p. 15, at 16, col. 1.
58. Postal Reg. 39 C.F.R. § 14.10 (Supp. 1959), declare that when "doubt exists as to the
mailability of [obscene] matter it shall be withheld and submitted to the General Counsel for
instructions."
59. Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311, 315 (1897); Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S.
420, 423 (1896); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 42 (1896); Goode v. United States,
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Another means of detection originates from the manner in which
mail is classified. All mail is classified into four categories; first,
second, third, and fourth. First class mail consists of letters and
other sealed matter.60 The government can open and examine this
type of mail only under a warrant; otherwise their action will consti-
tute an illegal search and seizure. Letters and sealed packages in
the mail are placed in the same protected category as are a person's
private property. This principle was expounded as early as 187761
and is still the law today."2
The second class, which affords the sender the most favorable
rate, embraces all newspapers and other periodical publications. 63
The government is free to inspect this material.64 This matter is
never sealed; thus, the problem of an illegal search and seizure does
not arise.65 Of course, if the sender wishes to circumvent a possible
inspection all he need do is to place the material in a sealed envelope
and pay the additional first class postage. In this way the Post Of-
fice could examine the contents only under the authority of a
warrant.66
All mail of the third and fourth classes is also open to examina-
tion. However, pursuant to postal regulations, the sender may seal
the material, pay first class postage, and avoid an inspection.6 Al-
though a solicitor of obscenity can circumvent the right of the Post
Office to examine the mail by sending it first class, such a choice will
be more expensive.6
The foregoing classifications of mail, together with the condi-
tions imposed upon each, have generally been sustained as a proper
exercise of congressional power70 The use of the mails is not a mat-
159 U.S. 663, 669 (1895); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895); United
States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
60. 20 Stat. 358 (1879), 39 U.S.C. § 222 (1958); Postal Reg., 39 C.F.R. §§ 21.1-.5 (Supp.
1959).
61. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
62. Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957).
63. 20 Stat. 359 (1879), 39 U.S.C. § 224 (1958); Postal Reg., 39 C.F.R. §§ 22.1-.8 (Supp.
1959).
64. 20 Star. 359 (1879), 39 U.S.C. § 225 (1958), provides that matter of the second class
may be examined at the office of mailing.
65. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877).
66. Id. at 733.
67. 37 Stat. 557 (1912), 39 U.S.C. § 243 (1958), provides that matter of the fourth class
shall be subject to examination.
68. 39 C.F.R. §§ 24.8(b), 25.7 (Supp. 1959).
69. For a listing of the various rates for first, second, third, and fourth class mail see 39
C.F.R. §§ 21.1, 22.1, 23.1, and 24.1 (Supp. 1959).
70. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913); Public Clearing House v. Coyne,
194 U.S. 497, 507 (1904).
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ter of right, but of privilege, 71 limited to mailable matter 72 and by
the right of Congress to classify.73
IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN THE LAW
Because section 1461 stated that no obscene article "shall be de-
posited" in the mails, the courts said that the offense was complete
upon the deposit of the illegal material.7 Hence, venue could ex-
ist only at the location of mailing.7 The deposit usually occurred
in New York or Los Angeles, and the courts there invariably imposed
light penalties. 7  Recently, section 1461 was amended, and now
reads no one "shall use the mails" to convey obscenity ;77 this enables
the government to establish venue at the district of receipt.
Although section 259(b) permits an interim impounding of 20
days before a final "unlawful" order is decreed, this interval has
proved inadequate, for it normally takes the Post Office 45 days to
complete administrative proceedings under section 259 (a) .7 In view
of the time required to break through the red tape, legislation which
would increase the length of the temporary order from twenty to
forty-five days is essential.79
Protect the Adolescent
The purpose of the fight against obscenity is to protect the chil-
dren of our country.80 At present this objective is not being accom-
71. United States v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921); Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 99
(1904); People's United States Bank v. Gilson, 140 Fed. 1, 5 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1905).
72. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 493 (1957); Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc.,
333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948); In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 133 (1892).
73. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877); Pike v. Walker, 121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C.
Cir. 1941).
74. Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 41 (1896); Ackley v. United States, 200 Fed. 217,
223 (8th Cit. 1912); United States v. Grimm, 45 Fed. 558, 559 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1891).
75. United States v. Ross, 205 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1953); United States v. Comerford, 25
Fed. 902, 905 (W.D. Tex. 1885).
76. Release No. 260, Post Office Department 1, 7 (Address by Postmaster General Arthur
E. Summerfield before the Women's City Club of Cleveland) October 8, 1959; Warburton,
You and the Law vs. Smut, This Week (Cleveland), September 27, 1959, p. 15, at 17, col. 4.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958).
78. Hearings on H.R. 7379 Before the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1959); Warburton, You and the Law vs. Smut, This Week (Cleveland),
September 27, 1959, p. 15, at 17, col. 2.
79. Such a bill passed the House with one dissenting vote on September 1, 1959, and is now
pending before the Senate, H.R. 7379, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
80. Release No. 260, Post Office Department (Address by Postmaster General Arthur E.
Summerfield before the Women's City Club of Cleveland) October 8, 1959; Release No. 170,
Post Office Department, July 6, 1959; Meisler, Filth Still Travels by Mail, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, November 1, 1959, § B, p. 1, col. 5; Warburton, You and the Law vs. Smut, This
Week (Cleveland), September 27, 1959, p. 15, col. 1.
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plished. The number of children receiving this harmful material
through the mails is increasing."'
Most psychiatrists and psychologists feel that an ordinary child
can be upset by obscenity in the sense that it may distort his emergial
concepts of sexuality, cause revulsion, anxiety, pre-occupation, and
guilt; and that occasionally a youth who already has a disturbed per-
sonality may be stimulated to a perverse offense by obscene literature.
They would deny, however, that a stable child brought up in a whole-
some family could be made delinquent or mentally ill by obscenity
alone .
2
By the standard pronounced in the Roth case, the test of obscenity
is the reasonable adult; thus, the child is unprotected, and any evi-
dence relating to the effect of lascivious matter upon him is irrele-
vant.8 3  The courts are faced with a dilemma - whether to protect
the child, or the inalienable right of free speech which is so deeply
rooted in our Constitution?
At present there is no federal law prohibiting the sale of obscene
material to adolescents. That such a statute could be constitutionally
drafted is entirely probable; there is dictum in at least two cases to
this effect.8 4  In holding expert testimony as to the undesirable effect
of obscenity upon juveniles to be irrelevant, the court in Volanski v.
United States stated:
If the causal effect of such material upon juvenile delinquency is demon-
strable, it may be assumed that an unambiguous statute specifically pro-
hibiting its distribution by interstate commerce to juveniles would be a
valid exercise of Congressional power. But Congress has not enacted
that kind of law.85
If the federal government does not draft such a statute, then it
is up to the respective states to do so; and even if the federal gov-
ernment were to pass such a law, that action would not preclude the
states from doing the same. Federal and state statutes outlawing
obscenity are not in conflict unless the state law physically interferes
with the federal.8 6
Until such laws are passed, the obligation to see that children
read only decent material primarily rests with the parents and within
the self-control of the individual reader.
81. The Post Office estimates that one out of every 35 children of school age in the nation
-will be exposed to the demoralizing effect of pornography.
82. Interviews with college psychiatrists and psychologist in Cleveland, Ohio, March 18,
1960: Benjamin Spock, M.D., Professor of Child Development; Jane W. Kessler, Ph.D.,
Director, Mental Development Center; Willard D. Boaz, M.D., Director, Child Psychiatry
Clinic.
83. -Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d 842, 844 (6th Cit. 1957).
84. Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); Volanski v. United States, 246 F.2d
842, 844 (6th Cir. 1957).
85. 246 F.2d 842, 844 (6th Cit. 1957).
86. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 494 (1957); Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S.
88, 96 (1945).
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CONCLUSION
The obscenity law is finally becoming more strict and promises
to continue in that direction in the future. When section 1461 was
held constitutional in the Roth case, the civil sanctions of sections
1461 and 259 (a) were also impliedly upheld. Moreover, since title
39 of the United States Code, section 259 (the fraud statute), dif-
fering only slightly from section 259 (a), has been held to be consti-
tutional, there is little room for question as to the validity of the
latter.
A grey area remains in the application of sections 1461 and
259(a). The Post Office Department must be careful to afford the
respondent a proper hearing, one as similar as possible to that pro-
vided for in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. Once the
material is judged to be obscene the order must envelope, if possible,
only that matter which is illegal. If these two requisites are not ad-
hered to, the government may discover that its otherwise effective
work has been in vain.
A word of caution should be interjected at this point lest that
which is merely risque or suggestive be labeled obscene; the material,
as a whole, must deal with sex in a manner appealing to the prurient
interest, and not just be obnoxious. The Post Office Department
and the courts should be particularly careful when applying this stand-
ard to literature, as opposed to photography, as the former is more
apt to possess some social value than is a wordless picture. The ma-
terial must be judged on a careful case by case determination, for
even a temporary loss of the use of the mails can cause irreparable
harm to the sender, especially in the case of a legitimate publisher
who may never be able to retrieve his losses.
WILLIAM J. SLIVKA
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